Post-marital residence is a sex-biased dispersal defined by the place where a newly-wed couple lives after marriage. Common choices for this practice include patrilocal residence, where the couple lives with the man's family, and matrilocal residence, where they live with the woman's family. Deviations from accepted practice typically invoke strong sanctions, but despite this pressure to conform to post-marital residence norms, residence states are unexpectedly dynamic over time. Theories have been proposed to explain the pressures, both internal and external, that drive these changes in post-marital residence state. Two of the most popular emphasize the importance of warfare, but are largely restricted to qualitative statements. Here, we develop an agent-based model that captures key features of these theories, with a particular focus on warfare. We show that warfare can change post-marital residence practices, but such change only propagates through a wider network of communities under a narrow set of conditions. Additional factors, potentially including a strong sex-bias in the division of labor, are required to induce change more widely. While warfare thus serves as an important trigger for residence change, multiple interacting forces appear to be necessary to shift communities between different post-marital residence states under most conditions.
Introduction
Sex-biased dispersal is a key aspect of population history, especially among social animals, where it can lead to the emergence of group collaboration and hierarchies ( Bradley et al., 2004; Lehmann and Boesch, 2009 ) . While the sex-dispersal strategy of most animals is usually stable ( Lawson Handley and Perrin, 2007 ) , human populations are notable for the variability and dynamic nature of their sex-dispersal patterns ( Moravec et al., 2018 ) .
In humans, sex-biased dispersal is usually framed within the context of post-marital residence, the location traditionally taken by a newly-wed couple after they marry. The social rules that dictate this behavior are responsible for the creation of extended families, which in turn form the backbone of wider societal organization. Post-marital residence rules also influence kinship ( Murdock, 1949 ) , warfare patterns ( Murdock, 1949; Ember and Ember, 1971; Divale, 1974 ) , and inheritance of property ( Leacock, 1955; Agarwal, 1988 ) , and can create striking genetic patterns ( Guillot et al., 2016; Lansing et al., 2017 ) . Norm violators typically residence states produce markedly different societal structures. For example, in matrilocal families, it is often not the wife, but her brothers, who have primary decision-making authority over the household ( Schneider, 1961 ) , while in patrilocal families, the husband is usually dominant. The conflict and internal instability that arises by separating authority from inheritance has been termed the "Matrilineal Puzzle" ( Richards, 1950 , see Mattison, 2011 .
Other post-marital residence rules are also found. Ambilocal residence occurs where it is socially acceptable for a couple to choose either matrilocal or patrilocal residence, and is often found in societies that require flexibility of residence, such as those with small population sizes, depopulation or resource fluctuation ( Service, 1962; Ember and Ember, 2004; Ensor, 2011; Scelza, 2011 ) . Neolocal residence occurs where newly-wed couples choose a new residence, thus creating no extended multi-generational families at all. This is typical in modern societies, and adoption of neolocal residence is well documented in the transition from a subsistence to a wage-based economy ( Ember, 1967; Morgan and Hirosima, 1983; Zhang, 2008; Ensor, 2011 ).
An extensive anthropological literature exists on the balances and tensions between matrilocality and patrilocality, but only two detailed theories have been proposed to explain the cause of transitions between them, the Warfare Theory of Matrilocality ( Ember and Ember, 1971 ) and the Migration Theory of Matrilocality ( Divale, 1974 ) . Despite their names, warfare is central to both.
Ember's Warfare Theory starts from empirical observation in assuming that patrilocality is the default residence state due to its global dominance. However, when warfare disrupts men's contribution to subsistence, societies transition to matrilocality, driven by the increasingly important role of women's labor. A key point of the model is that warfare must be external; warfare pressure on a group of intermarrying villages must come from neighboring, but culturally different, communities. In this setting, there is no need to keep related men nearby, as either brothers or husbands can be recruited for protection. In contrast, even low levels of internal warfare -feuding -encourages villagers to keep their sons at home for protection; husbands from other villages may be unreliable due to possible familial affiliations with would-be attackers. Ember (1974) expanded on this idea by suggesting that small societies almost never wage internal warfare due to the necessarily close relationships of their members.
Divale's Migration Theory is more complex. Divale starts from the premise that external (often, environmental) pressure compels societies to move into new, but already occupied, land. This sudden increase in population puts pressure on existing resources (water, farmland or hunting grounds), and a common reaction to these stressors is warfare between the incoming and pre-existing communities. In this setting, Divale (1974) suggests that adopting matrilocality is an adaptive response; it breaks down feuding fraternal interest groups, radically reducing internal warfare, and thus enables communities to commit entirely to external warfare with neighboring communities. This is the inverse of the relationship between internal warfare and post-marital residence proposed by Ember. Divale (1984) later refined his theory by expanding on these putatively adaptive qualities. Villages on the borderlands experience more warfare and greater mortality than villages near the heartland of a set of communities, forcing border villages to replenish losses by attracting young male warriors from non-combatant villages with the promise of easy marriage. It is less clear why matrilocality should consequently spread from the outskirts to the core; men in patrilocal communities presumably require significant incentives to abandon their privileged positions as heads of their families, but greater marriage opportunities may provide sufficient benefit.
Both theories have been investigated qualitatively since they were first proposed fifty years ago. Ember (1974) mused that the two theories differ primarily in the importance they place on the causal relationship between warfare and residence. In the Warfare Theory , external warfare itself drives residence change; in the Migration Theory , it is residence that is partly responsible for changes in the nature of warfare. Subsequent literature has largely focused on the nuances: the effects of population size ( Ember, 1974 ) ; the role of local cooperation versus strong state-level organization; and the potential precondition that internal peace is required for successful migration ( Korotayev, 2003 ) . However, answering the central question -can warfare change post-marital residence norms? -was limited by the methods of the time, and never satisfactorily resolved.
Today, quantitative modeling offers an alternative path to study cultural evolution ( Mesoudi, 2016 ) . While models must be used with care to ensure that their results are not preordained by the assumptions or the programming, they are becoming more common for studying social and human behaviors ( Epstein, 1999; Gilbert, 2007 ) . Agent-based models, where individual agents act and react to their own choices and those of surrounding agents, are an especially popular tool in cultural evolution, with applications in the study of collaboration ( Crabtree, 2015 ) , cultural diffusion ( Crema et al., 2014 ) and marriage ( Billari et al., 2007 ) .
Unlike the purely descriptive models of Divale and Ember, mathematical models demand more precise specification, and causal factors and relationships are often easier to explore. Such models are, ironically, especially useful where detailed quantitative data do not exist, as is often the case in anthropology, because sweeps of variables and their interactions can be analyzed to determine the relative importance of different parameters. Post-marital residence has been a topic of particular interest in quantitative cultural evolution studies, but almost entirely against a backdrop of linguistic data ( Jordan et al., 2009; Fortunato and Jordan, 2010; Opie et al., 2014; Ji et al., 2016; Moravec et al., 2018 ) .
Here, we present a bespoke agent-based model that implements key aspects of Ember's Warfare Theory of Matrilocality and Divale's Migration Theory of Matrilocality . Computer simulation allows us to test multiple parameter values within the constraints of the model, enables statistical analysis of results based on multiple independent runs, and facilitates the identification of critical changes that enable causality to be tested explicitly. We investigate possible mechanisms that may induce post-marital residence change, with a special focus on warfare, and we identify the parameter combinations that appear to be most influential in invoking this change. Through a modeling approach, we thus seek to explain why and how post-marital residence norms change.
Methods
We developed an agent-based model with the primary goal of simulating key aspects of Ember's Warfare Theory of Matrilocality ( Ember and Ember, 1971 ) and Divale's Migration Theory of Matrilocality ( Divale, 1974; 1984 ) . Residence change is induced through three mechanisms: warfare mortality of male warriors, leading to a sex imbalance and thus new marriage opportunities for incoming men; pressure to conform with the residence norms of neighboring communities with the marriage opportunities such conformity brings; and through a constant social pressure towards matrilocal residence, such as from female-biased division of labor.
Code
Free and open source code for the model, implemented in Java using the Repast Simphony framework ( North et al., 2013 ), is provided at https://github.com/J-Moravec/abmwipmrc . Analysis tools to process the model output, written in R, are available at https: //github.com/J-Moravec/abmwipmrc _ data .
General setting
According to Ember's Warfare Theory , warfare with external parties alone (sometimes coupled with matridominant division of labor) is linked with matrilocal residence, while patridominant labor and/or internal warfare ("feuding") is linked with patrilocal residence. According to Divale's Migration Theory , a community forced to relocate to a new, already occupied environment experiences resource restrictions, leading to external warfare. This warfare produces disproportionate losses of men in villages near the border with the enemy. An influx of new male warriors into these villages from the core, drawn by marriage opportunities, induces a switch to matrilocality, which is then predicted to cascade back through the system.
Internal warfare plays a role in both theories. However, while the various definitions provided for internal warfare -namely, fighting between inter-marrying villages ( Ember and Ember, 1971 ) , within a society ( Ember and Ember, 1971 ) or between political entities within the same cultural unit ( Divale, 1974 ) -may be sufficient for verbal arguments, we quickly found that they are too vague to be implemented easily in a quantitative model. The descriptions imply a complex scenario of marriage and alliancebased relationships that would need to be modeled explicitly (see Macfarlan et al., 2018 for an example), with parameter values currently unsupported by available empirical data. Fortunately, Ember notes that small societies usually dampen down internal warfare through the strength of informal relationships ( Ember, 1974 ) . Thus, because our simulations are focused on small communities, we circumvent the need to model internal warfare. In a similar vein, we can also set aside migration by starting our model from the second stage of Divale's theory (i.e., after the communities have already moved into new territory). These simplifications allow us to engage directly with the question of residence and external warfare.
Model
The agent-based model simulates relationships between postmarital residence and external warfare for a set of interacting villages. We draw heavily from the scenario of Divale, whose model is described more completely ( Divale, 1984 ) . We focus particularly on the later stages of Divale's model, where two groups of villages are actively engaged in warfare. Villages of the newly-arrived cultural group, the agents in our model, are placed on a grid 10 villages wide and 5 villages deep. One side is defined as bordering aggressive pre-existing communities from an alternative cultural tradition, which are not simulated directly, but affect newly-arrived villages on the border indirectly through warfare pressure (e.g., raiding). If a border community is destroyed, the next community in the same row is attacked ( Fig. 1 ) . Villages cannot re-colonize empty spots.
Post-marital residence states can change in three ways: through marriage pressure (a strategy whereby individuals optimize their A graphical representation of age-sex cohorts, age-pair cohorts and their dynamics. The population is tracked using cohorts of men (red), women (blue) and married couples (purple) of various ages. Each cohort grows older (black arrows) until they are removed from the model at age 50. During each five year time step, unmarried men and women of eligible age can marry and form a pair, which in turn can produce children (gray arrows). Not represented in this figure is warfare, where both married and unmarried men can die. On the death of a married man, the pair is dissolved and the woman becomes eligible to marry again. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) number of potential marriage partners); through men dying in warfare (leading to an increase in the number of unmarried women and a consequent incentive for men to abandon patrilocal villages elsewhere and move to the border village); and through a small matrilocal pressure (mimicking the effect of matridominant labor, as proposed by Ember).
Each simulation step represents a period of five years, during which the demography of each village (chosen in random order at each time step) is simulated using a cohort model; marriage and population exchange occurs; and villages can change their postmarital residence norm.
Population structure
Each village contains a population of individuals classified according to age, sex and marriage status. Individuals are grouped into age cohorts covering five years (a single simulation time step), with the maximum age set to 50, after which death (or, at least, irrelevancy to the action of the model) is assumed. Ten age cohorts were created in total. The age of first marriage was set to 20-25, which is also the period of first possible pregnancy. The first cohort capable of fighting was set to 15-20, since in many cultures young males need to show bravery in battle before they are allowed to marry ( Divale and Harris, 1976; Albert, 1990; Glowacki and Wrangham, 2013 ) . When a couple marries, they are removed from their respective age-sex cohort and placed into an age-pair cohort. If one individual of this pair dies (e.g., from warfare), the surviving individual returns to its respective age-sex cohort and can remarry; see Fig. 2 for a visual representation. We thus model only monogamous relationships. While monogamy is certainly not a universal practice, one important effect of polygamy -many men unable to find brides -can be replicated by reducing the number of women in each generation.
Population growth
Population growth is assumed to be logistic. Only married pairs can have children; children can be born only when their parents are aged 20-50; and fertility is constant between the age groups. For simplicity, we do not model natural mortality except for the last age cohort (age 50).
The number of newborns is modeled as:
where N newborns is the number of newborns, N pairs is the number of married pairs, N total is the total population size, r is the growth rate and K is the carrying capacity of the environment. Both r and K are free variables in the model. Newborns are assigned a sex according to a binomial distribution. To provide the empirically observed bias towards male babies ( Hassan and Sengel, 1973; George et al., 1992; Watts and Zimmerman, 20 02; Vishwanath, 20 04 ) , the ratio of males to females was set to 116 100 , so Pr (male child) ≈ 0.537 (see Divale and Harris, 1976 ) .
Warfare
External warfare is modeled as occurring between villages on the border of the grid of simulated communities and theoretical enemy villages beyond that border. These enemies influence the simulated villages only through warfare pressure, W = αP e , which has two parameters: the killing efficiency α, and the number of enemy soldiers P e . Using Lanchester's square law ( Lanchester, 1916; , warfare losses of villages under warfare pressure P , where P is the military power of a village, are directly proportional to the warfare pressure: P = −W = −αP e . Warfare deaths are distributed among the adult male cohorts (ages 15-50) according to a multinomial distribution.
Marriage
To simulate marriages, we randomly select an individual to be married by first choosing a village, then a cohort, then a sex. We then determine the marriage type: either matching the village's post-marital residence norm ('primary'), or the opposite residence state ('secondary'). Another individual is then selected from the same age cohort but opposite sex (see Appendix A for details). This process is repeated according to the following steps until no further marriages are possible:
i. Choose a source village X from the set of villages with probability proportional to the number of marriageable people in each village. ii. For source village X , choose a cohort c with probability proportional to the number of marriageable people in each cohort. iii. For village X and cohort c , choose a sex s with probability proportional to the number of marriageable people of each sex. iv. Choose a type of marriage (primary or secondary) with predefined probability p , the probability of the primary marriage type. v. Pick a target village Y from villages immediately neighboring X (including X itself) with probability proportional to the number of marriageable partners of cohort c and opposite sex s in each village. vi. If no possible marriage partner exists, ignore the individual for the remainder of this time step. vii. If a partner is found, remove both individuals from their respective sex-cohorts and create a pair in the village defined by the chosen marriage type (i.e., for primary marriage, the pair moves to the husband's village if the marriage is patrilocal, or to the wife's village if the marriage is matrilocal). viii. Repeat for all unmarried individuals.
Residence change
Two forms of post-marital residence change were implemented: change resulting from warfare-induced losses, which encourages patrilocal villages to switch to matrilocality; and change resulting from the efforts of individuals to maximize their number of potential marriage partners ('marriage pressure'). In contrast to change from warfare-induced losses, change from marriage pressure can act in both directions (i.e., from patrilocality to matrilocality, and the reverse). As such, marriage pressure acts as a stabilizing or homogenizing force.
The probability that a village will switch its post-marital residence state due to warfare-induced losses depends on the size of the warfare pressure, W = αP e (defined in the Warfare section above), and the military power of the village P :
where R P is patrilocal residence, R M is matrilocal residence and the military power P is the sum of all warriors in the village from ages 15-50. The probability that a village will change its post-marital residence state due to marriage pressure depends on the ratio between the number of potential marriage partners available under the current residence state versus those available under the alternate residence state. If more potential partners are available under the residence state that differs from the current norm, the village may change its residence state, otherwise it will not. Matrilocal pressure can change this balance in favor of matrilocal residence, so that a matrilocal village may stay matrilocal even if the number of potential partners is greater under the alternative regime, and conversely, a patrilocal village may change towards matrilocality even though this may limit marriage possibilities.
The number of potential partners is a village's estimate of the size of its available marriage market. Formally, it is the sum of the people available for marriage in the vicinity of the village, adjusted by the marriage weight, which characterizes the agreement or disagreement in cultural marriage norms between two villages. These comparisons are made while explicitly accounting for the respective age and sex cohorts. The probability that a village will change its post-marital residence state due to marriage pressure is thus:
with marriage pressure defined as: 1 − c F cX
where F cX and M cX are marriageable individuals in the female and male age cohorts of village X, γ is the matrilocal pressure (negative if the village is matrilocal, positive if patrilocal), and P mcX and P f cX are the set of potential partners in a specific male or female age cohort:
where M sci is cohort c of sex s in the i th village and D X is the set of villages within an interaction distance of village X (see Appendix A for details). The marriage weight w i is p (the probability of the primary marriage type) if marriage R follows the residence norm of village i and 1 − p otherwise. P scX denotes the potential partners for a specific age-sex cohort if the village changes its residence state. This is calculated in the same manner as P scX , but with the assumption that the village changes its post-marital residence to the alternative state R . This change is then reflected in the new marriage weights w i between villages.
Neutrality
The model adopts what is essentially a fitness maximization approach. It is worth considering, however, that post-marital residence change might occur through drift dynamics rather than directed selection, as has been suggested in other anthropological settings ( Lansing et al., 2008; Lansing and Cox, 2011 ) . To test this neutral hypothesis ( Gould and Lewontin, 1979 ) , we ran simulations that included marriage pressure, but excluded warfare. This allowed us to isolate the effects of matrilocal pressure from the effects of warfare.
Order of evaluation
Each five year time step in the model includes i) marriage, ii) growth and warfare, and iii) residence change, evaluated in that order. These steps are computed for all communities (chosen in random order) before the following step begins.
Experimental design
The behavior of the model was explored using four parameter sweeps. The first parameter sweep employed a broad parameter grid ('full parameter set'). This was restricted in later parameter sweeps ('restricted parameter set') to reduce run time, but with additional parameters added to explore important aspects of the model: the depth of the village grid; variable rates of matrilocal pressure; and a flag to disallow switches to matrilocality. For an overview, see Table 1 for parameter sweeps, Table 2 for parameter  variables, and Table 3 for fixed parameters used in the simulations.
The model was run 50 times for each parameter combination to obtain a reliable sample of model stochasticity. For each run, the model was simulated for 1100 time steps, with the first 100 steps defined as burn-in, without warfare, to remove the effects of starting conditions. The burn-in phase was excluded from subsequent analyses. The 10 0 0 step time frame was experimentally verified to be long enough for all relevant behaviors to appear.
Results
As expected, high warfare pressure consistently caused villages immediately bordering the enemy to switch to matrilocality across a wide range of parameter values. However, frequent transitions to matrilocality, surpassing 80% ( Fig. 3 , Fig. S.1) , are typically associated with high rates of village extinction, which is common under many parameter settings. This is expected, as more frequent switches to matrilocality should occur when a larger proportion of villages are experiencing warfare pressure. However, high levels of village extinction, and widespread prevalence of matrilocality, are not observed by anthropologists, suggesting that many of these parameter settings are poor fits to real-world expectations.
To understand this behavior, we defined a metric, Expected Matrilocality (EM), the highest value of matrilocality that would be expected for a given number of villages:
We find that EM is only reached for parameter combinations that impose substantial warfare pressure; otherwise, even villages immediately adjacent to the enemy are often not forced to switch to matrilocality, and thus matrilocality rates lower than EM are readily observed. By comparing EM with the average matrilocality rate attained by villages, we can identify parameter sets where marriage pressure spreads matrilocality beyond the area under direct warfare pressure (i.e., the first column of villages). We call this behavior 'Surpassed Expected Matrilocality' (SEM) and characterize it in two ways: first, the number of runs (and/or time points of interests) with matrilocality greater than EM (nSEM), and second, the average value of SEM (vSEM). These two statistics can summarize large numbers of runs (including entire parameter sweeps); characterize performance at time points of interest; and identify the effects of specific parameter sets.
Relatively few outcome classes are observed across the parameter sweeps, suggesting that these summary statistics provide a fair reflection of the behavior of the model (Fig. S.1) .
Switch to matrilocality
While high warfare pressure consistently drove transitions to matrilocality in parameter sweep 1, this seldom resulted in matrilocality spreading beyond villages exposed to direct warfare pressure, irrespective of how long the model ran for. Even where EM was surpassed ( Table 4 ) , this was usually just barely (nSEM(%) = 0.0362, vSEM = 0.0 0 09). This behavior is not expected if either theory is correct, because the parameter sweep was designed to span a broad combination of model parameters, ranging from strong warfare pressure and weak population growth, to weak warfare pressure and strong population growth. The largest value of vSEM in parameter sweep 1 (0.0362) was observed at the end of the simulation, but is an order of magnitude lower than the maximum value possible given the number of villages (0.3342) or the maximum value possible for the entire data set (0.8) ( Fig. 3 ) . While untested parameter combinations between the simulated grid points may conceivably produce higher values of vSEM, this result more likely suggests that warfare by itself is insufficient to spread matrilocality beyond communities directly experiencing warfare, at least in the form of the model implemented here.
Community size
The results so far have explored whether warfare-induced matrilocality can spread through a community of villages. The key conclusion is that marriage pressure from patrilocal communities living behind the area directly exposed to warfare forms a major barrier to the wider spread of matrilocality. To test whether a narrower depth of the community (and hence a higher proportion of villages engaged in warfare) can decrease this marriage pressure and allow matrilocality to spread, we allowed the depth (i.e., number of columns) of villages at war to vary between 1 and 3 (parameter sweep 2). With the width held constant, the total number of non-warring villages decreased to 30, 20 and 10 for depths 3, 2 and 1, respectively. The proportion of villages that switch to matrilocality in these cases is much higher, often reaching 100% ( Fig. 4 ) .
The number of runs with matrilocality greater than EM (nSEM) does not differ substantially between parameter sweeps 1 and 2 (0.362 versus 0.393), but average SEM values (vSEM) are Fig. 3 , just two layers of villages that are not exposed to warfare are sufficient to prevent the spread of matrilocality.
substantially higher (0.0 0 09 versus 0.1081). The most successful configuration to reach high SEM values is depth 2 ( Table 5 ) , which comprises two layers of villages with only the first engaged in warfare. In this setting, high rates of matrilocality can be reached without loss of villages, and a higher proportion of matrilocal communities is attained than in simulations with a larger number of villages (e.g., parameter set 1). These results show that the same parameter combinations can have significantly different effects depending on the topological arrangement of villages. 
Matrilocal pressure
To simulate the effect of matridominant division of labor and test its influence on the adoption of matrilocal residence, we included a small matrilocal pressure added or subtracted to marriage pressure in favor of matrilocality (parameter sweep 3). Surprisingly, even small levels of matrilocal pressure increased the adoption of matrilocality considerably (vSEM = 0.5626 for matrilocal pressure of 0.1) ( Table 6 ) , and in numerous cases, even led to its fixation ( Fig. 5 ) . Notably, the adoption of matrilocality occurs relatively early in the simulations, even for small values of matrilocal pressure. To determine whether these changes might in part reflect neutral drift dynamics, we isolated the effects of matrilocal pressure from the effects of warfare. To do so, we ran additional simulations with marriage pressure, but without warfare. Substantial matrilocal pressure alone is sufficient to induce societies to change towards matrilocal residence ( Table 7 ) . Equally, however, a large population size combined with a high preferred marriage weight proved to be a substantial barrier to residence change. In contrast, matrilocal pressure coupled with warfare readily induces communities to switch to matrilocality. This suggests that pressures other than warfare may influence communities to change to matrilocality, even if warfare does have a special role. These non-warfare factors, and their synergy with warfare, would be worth exploring further.
Adaptive effects of matrilocality
One of the main points of Divale's Migration Theory is that switching to matrilocal residence while under strong warfare pressure has beneficial, adaptive qualities. However, changing postmarital residence state can also cut off a village from its broader community due to new cultural barriers that decrease the probability of intermarriage. It is thus unclear whether matrilocality provides an adaptive advantage or not.
We tested this by adding a switch to the model that disables transitions to matrilocality (i.e., no residence change can occur during the model run and all villages remain patrilocal). We compared the number of villages that evaded extinction in this modified run (parameter sweep 4) against the earlier parameter sweeps.
Matrilocality provides a major adaptive advantage ( Fig. 6 ). Large deviations from zero indicate substantial differences in behavior when switching to matrilocality is or is not allowed ( Table 8 ) . Green points on the plot show benefits for populations that switch to matrilocality, and the proportion of these cases increases over time. Red points indicate the relatively few instances where switching to matrilocality is deleterious, and blue points indicate parameters with no effect. In rare cases, a switch to matrilocality can actually prevent the extinction of the entire village network.
In most cases, however, switching to matrilocality does not completely prevent village extinction, and often this effect is strong only towards the end of the simulation.
Discussion
Post-marital residence dynamics have largely been studied only through association tests (e.g., Driver, 1956; Brown, 1970; Ember and Ember, 1971; Divale, 1974 ) . These were effective at discovering relationships between post-marital residence and factors such as warfare and the division of labor by sex ( Ember and Ember, 1971; Ember, 1974; Divale, 1984 ) . However, these factors often interact in complex ways and associations alone were agnostic to causal relationships. While not without its own weak points, simulation offers an opportunity to resolve causality. The work described here is a first attempt to apply simulation modeling to the study of postmarital residence change.
Our primary focus was on the role of warfare to induce change in post-marital residence states, particularly the transition from patrilocality to matrilocality. We ran four sets of experiments to explore whether and how warfare can cause residence transitions in communities of villages under a range of realistic demographic and social conditions. The parameters used in this model can conceptually be divided into two groups: demographic parameters, which can be further subdivided into growth-related factors (growth rate and carrying capacity) and warfare-related factors (warfare pressure and yearly warfare mortality); and marriage parameters (marriage weight: the preference to marry a person with the same post-marital residence state).
Most demographic parameters exhibited relatively monotone behavior across the parameter sets, with the most common patterns being decreasing nSEM and increasing vSEM with higher values of warfare-related parameters, and the inverse for higher values of growth-related parameters. The only consistently nonmonotone behavior of any demographic parameter involved the growth rate. Low growth rates returned high values of nSEM, with increasing values showing a drop in nSEM followed by a slow rebound, but always to a considerably smaller value. Population Fig. 6 . The effects of matrilocality on village survival at different time steps (ae). Graphs show the difference in the average number of surviving villages ( y -axis) under paired parameter conditions where transitions to matrilocality are or are not allowed to occur. Green points indicate cases where a switch to matrilocality is beneficial; red where it is deleterious; and blue where the switch has no effect. Parameter combinations are not shown if all villages became extinct regardless of whether switching to matrilocality was or was not allowed. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
growth is therefore an influential variable. However, the Divale and Ember theories only discussed population growth in very general ways. In contrast, these simulation models suggest that the roles of demography and community structure on cultural decision-making are worth examining in much more detail. The effect of marriage weights on switching to matrilocal residence was different for each parameter set. In parameter sweep 1, the behavior was monotonic with greatest nSEM and vSEM for the maximal value of the weight, which might suggest that cultural marriage barriers are important for maintaining matrilocality. In parameter sweep 2, the smallest value of the marriage weight (0.5, indicating no preference between residence states) had the smallest nSEM and vSEM. For other values of the marriage weight, the nSEM was relatively constant, but the vSEM reached its maximum at the second smallest marriage weight and then decreased slowly. Finally, for parameter sweep 3, the nSEM and vSEM were both monotonic, with maxima reached at the smallest value of the marriage weight.
Our model suggests that marriage pressure itself, such as from sex-biased division of labor or male absence, is sufficient to encourage transitions to matrilocality. However, higher values of marriage weight combined with greater population size can limit the adoption of matrilocal residence. This seems counter-intuitive, as large self-sustaining populations should perhaps be less concerned with isolating themselves from other communities. It is, however, possible that marriage barriers and large population sizes offer social stability, while smaller populations are more often forced to react to their constantly changing cultural environment. In contrast, marriage pressure combined with warfare provides a strong incentive to change residence, regardless of powerful marriage norms or a large population size. This supports the original idea of Ember and Ember (1971) , as well as the global finding that matridominant labor and matrilocal residence are associated only in North America, but not worldwide ( Driver, 1956; Brown, 1970 ) .
Overall, we draw three key conclusions. First, at least for warfare, villages must usually be under direct warfare pressure to transition to matrilocality. We suspect that this requirement for direct pressure may also hold for other factors, such as the effects of matridominant division of labor and male absence. Communities have an inherent inertia to switch their marriage practices, and the model (and common sense) suggests there must be compelling reasons to do so. Second, matrilocality appears to have some adaptive benefits, at least under certain conditions. The model suggests that villages that are exposed to warfare and switch to matrilocality are more likely to survive. This is consistent with the real-world observation that matrilocal communities are more effective at waging war ( Hawkes, 1981; Dye, 2009; Jones, 2011 ) . Third, a complex interplay exists between the size of individual villages, the size of village networks and the relative benefits of matrilocality. This interaction dynamic was perhaps not fully appreciated in the original theories on which our simulation model is based, but appears to be a worthwhile target for further study.
While our results do not directly refute Divale's theory ( Divale, 1974; 1984 ) , they do highlight that switching to matrilocality due to warfare pressure is only likely to occur under a relatively restricted set of conditions, specifically when most villages within the broader network of communities are under attack. Additionally, warfare is not always required, and other factors can facilitate change to matrilocality even in the absence of warfare. Villages experiencing warfare directly switch more readily to matrilocality, and this effect is more noticeable when a greater number of villages are under attack. However, the marriage opportunities of villages not at war are also affected, and it is thus likely that the structure of the marriage network itself plays the more important role ( Rowe, 1960; Houseman, 1997; White and Houseman, 2002 ) .
These results provide support for Ember's emphasis on the sex-biased division of labor ( Ember and Ember, 1971 ) . Matrilocality is unable to spread as a cultural practice across a network of communities in the presence of warfare, due to strong conservative pressures to retain the current post-marital residence state. Some additional pressure seems to be needed to compensate for this natural conservatism, and this pressure may well be provided by sex-biased division of labor, male absence or other factors that have been proposed from earlier association studies ( Murdock, 1949; Ember, 1974; Otterbein, 1977; Korotayev, 2003; Mattison, 2016 ) . It seems likely that these factors may, in combination or even by themselves, help lower the inertia to change. Curiously, the current model suggests that situations may even exist where cultural barriers to marriage may increase the spread of matrilocality, although the opposite effect is much more likely. Post-marital residence dynamics therefore seem to act like many other complex adaptive systems, with unpredictable feedback relationships that the original theories were not able to take into account.
While the model implemented here was designed to capture certain points of Ember's Warfare Theory ( Ember and Ember, 1971 ) and Divale's Migration Theory ( Divale, 1974 ) , it was not intended to be, and should not be taken as, a complete representation of those theories. In particular, we emphasize that many of the processes described in the theories were by necessity simplified substantially, either due to a lack of mechanistic understanding of processes described only verbally, limited information about particular parameters (notably internal warfare), or the sheer complexity of the processes described in the theories. Further, there is generally insufficient real-world data to enable the parameters of any more complex model to be reliably fitted. Still, the model produces many of the behaviors and properties proposed by both theories of matrilocality. It suggests that neither theory is entirely satisfactory and strongly suggests that they need to be integrated and perhaps not viewed as separate theories at all. Equally importantly, the model indicates that other factorsparticularly population growth and community topology -may not previously have been given sufficient consideration, and may now be productive directions for future work.
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